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Abstract
This paper proposes a theory of pricing premised upon the assumptions that customers dislike unfair
prices—those marked up steeply over cost—and that firms take these concerns into account when
setting prices. Since they do not observe firms’ costs, customers must extract costs from prices. The
theory assumes that customers infer less than rationally: when a price rises due to a cost increase,
customers partially misattribute the higher price to a higher markup—which they find unfair. Firms
anticipate this response and trim their price increases, which drives the passthrough of costs into
prices below one: prices are somewhat rigid. Embedded in a New Keynesian model as a replacement
for the usual pricing frictions, our theory produces monetary nonneutrality: when monetary policy
loosens and inflation rises, customers misperceive markups as higher and feel unfairly treated; firms
mitigate this perceived unfairness by reducing their markups; in general equilibrium, employment
rises. The theory also features a hybrid short-run Phillips curve, realistic impulse responses of output
and employment to monetary and technology shocks, and an upward-sloping long-run Phillips curve.
(JEL: L11, E31, D91, E71)
1. Introduction
Prices are neither exactly fixed nor fully responsive to cost shocks (Carlsson and Skans
2012; De Loecker et al. 2016; Caselli et al. 2017; Ganapati et al. 2020). Such price
rigidity has first-order importance by determining how economic shocks percolate
through the economy as well as the effectiveness of different policy responses.
Asked why they show such restraint when setting prices, firm managers explain
that they endeavor to avoid alienating customers, who balk at paying prices that they
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regard as unfair (Blinder et al. 1998). Yet theories of price rigidity never include
fairness considerations (Blanchard 1990; Mankiw and Reis 2010), with the notable
exception of the theory by Rotemberg (2005), which calls attention to the role of
fairness in pricing.1 Due to its innovative nature, however, that theory is somewhat
difficult to analyze or use in other frameworks (see Section 2).
This paper develops a theory of pricing that incorporates the fairness concerns
exhibited by firms and their customers and uses such concerns to generate the price
rigidity observed in the data. The theory permits closed-form expressions for price
markups and passthroughs, as well as a set of comparative statics. It also transfers
easily to other frameworks: here, we port it to a New Keynesian model to study the
macroeconomic implications.
The first element of our theory is that customers dislike paying prices marked
up heavily over marginal costs because they find these prices unfair, and that firms
understand this. This assumption draws upon evidence from numerous surveys of
consumers and firms, our own survey of French bakers, and religious and legal texts
(Section 3). We formalize this assumption by weighting each unit of consumption in
the utility function by a fairness factor which depends upon the markup that customers
perceive firms as charging: the fairness factor decreases in the perceived markup—
higher markups seem less fair—and is concave—people respond more strongly to
increases in markups than to decreases.
Customers who cannot observe firms’ costs estimate these costs from prices, and
then use their estimates to evaluate firms’ fairness. The second element of our theory
is that customers update their beliefs about marginal costs less than rationally. First,
customers underinfer marginal cost from price: their beliefs depend upon some anchor,
which may be their prior expectation of marginal cost. Second, insofar as customers
do update their beliefs about marginal cost from price, they engage in a form of
proportional thinking by estimating a marginal cost that is proportional to price. We
dub this pair of assumptions subproportional inference. They draw upon evidence that
during inflationary periods people seem to underinfer increases in nominal costs, and
more generally that people tend to infer less than they should about others’ private
information from others’ actions (see also Section 3).
We begin our analysis by embedding these psychological elements into a model
of monopoly pricing (Section 4). The monopolist’s price features a markup that
decreases in the price elasticity of demand. We assume a standard utility function,
with the property that customers without fairness concerns would exhibit constant
price elasticity of demand.
Absent fairness concerns, the monopolist would set a constant markup that
produces flexible prices, which move proportionally to marginal costs. If customers
cared about fairness and rationally inverted the price to uncover the hidden marginal
1. Fairness has received more attention in other contexts: Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1990),
and Benjamin (2015) add fairness to labor-market models; Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and
Charness and Rabin (2002) to game-theoretic models; and Fehr et al. (2007) to contract-theoretic models.
For surveys of the fairness literature, see Fehr and Gachter (2000), Sobel (2005), and Fehr et al. (2009).
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cost, the same pricing rule would be an equilibrium. Indeed, when price increases by
x%, customers correctly infer that marginal cost has increased by x%, and therefore
that the markup has not changed. Since the price change does not change the perceived
markup, the price elasticity of demand does not change, and neither does the markup.
Once fairness concerns and subproportional inference come together, however,
pricing changes. First, demand is more price elastic than it would be otherwise,
leading the monopoly to lower its markup. Indeed, demand decreases in price not only
through the standard channel, but also through a fairness channel. Customers who see
a higher price attribute it partially to a higher marginal cost and partially to a higher
markup—which they find unfair. Thus the higher price lowers their marginal utility of
consumption, which further decreases demand.
Second, demand is more price elastic at higher perceived markups, creating
price rigidity. Following a price increase spurred by a cost increase, customers
underappreciate the increase in marginal cost and partially misattribute the higher
price to higher markup. Since the fairness factor is decreasing and concave in the
perceived markup, it is more elastic at higher perceived markups; this property
translates to demand. Facing a more elastic demand after the cost increase, the
monopoly reduces its markup. As a result, the price increases less than proportionally
to the underlying marginal cost. This mild form of price rigidity agrees with the
passthroughs of marginal-cost shocks into prices estimated in empirical studies.
Price rigidity plays a central role in many macroeconomic models. To illustrate
how our theory can be embedded into such models, and to develop its implications,
we substitute it for the usual pricing frictions in a New Keynesian model (Section 5).
Again we assume that customers infer less than they should about marginal cost from
price. In the dynamic model, subproportional inference means that in each period,
customers average their previous-period beliefs about marginal costs with beliefs that
are proportional to current prices.
The macroeconomic model makes several realistic predictions. First, monetary
policy is nonneutral in the short run: it affects output and employment. This property
arises through the same channel as in the monopoly model: expansionary monetary
policy raises prices and nominal marginal costs; customers partially misattribute
higher prices to higher markups, which they perceive as unfair; as a result, the
price elasticities of the demands for goods rise; firms respond by reducing markups,
thus stimulating the economy. Second, the New Keynesian Phillips curve is hybrid:
it links current employment not only to current and to expected future inflation,
but also to past inflation. The reason is that consumers form backward-looking
beliefs about marginal costs, which forces firms to account for both past and future
inflation when setting prices. Third, the model yields reasonable impulse responses to
monetary shocks and to technology shocks when the parameters governing fairness
concerns and subproportional inference are calibrated to match the microevidence
on cost passthroughs. In particular, the impulse responses of employment are hump-
shaped. Fourth, monetary policy is nonneutral in the long run: higher steady-state
inflation leads to higher steady-state employment; that is, the long-run Phillips curve
is nonvertical.
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Our macroeconomic model is also consistent with survey evidence that inflation
angers people—who attribute it to commercial greed—whereas deflation pleases
people. In our model, because people partially misattribute higher prices to higher
markups, inflation leads them to perceive transactions as less fair, generating disutility.
Conversely, deflation leads people to misperceive markups as lower and deem
transactions more fair, generating utility.
2. Related Literature
Rotemberg (2005) developed the first theory of price rigidity based on fairness
considerations.2 Customers in his model care about firms’ altruism, which they
evaluate following every price change. They purchase a normal amount from a firm
unless they can reject the hypothesis that the firm is sufficiently altruistic, in which
case they withhold demand entirely to lower the firm’s profits. Profit-maximizing
firms react to the discontinuity in demand by refraining from passing on small cost
increases, creating price stickiness. Consumers err in equilibrium by mistaking purely
selfish firms as altruistic.
We depart from Rotemberg’s discontinuous, buy-normally-or-buy-nothing
formulation to one in which customers continuously reduce demand as the unfairness
of the transaction increases. Our continuous formulation seems more realistic and
offers greater tractability. The tractability allows for closed-form expressions for the
markup and passthrough, and thus to obtain a range of comparative statics. The
tractability also allows us to embed our pricing theory into a New Keynesian model,
to calibrate the theory’s parameters based on microevidence, and to perform standard
simulations.
More broadly, our approach to fairness differs from the popular social-preferences
approach, both the intention-based model of Rabin (1993) and the distribution-based
model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Like Rotemberg’s model, these models predict that
consumers endeavor to harm firms by withholding demand to lower profits in certain
circumstances—namely when the firm treats consumers unkindly (Rabin 1993), and
when the firm receives a higher payoff than consumers (Fehr and Schmidt 1999).
In our model, by contrast, because customers simply do not savor unfairly priced
goods, they withhold demand irrespective of any harm to the firm. An advantage of our
approach, which appears in its macroeconomic application, is that fairness continues
to matter in general equilibrium. This is not the case with many social preferences:
when people’s utility can be written as a separable function of their own and others’
allocations, social preferences do not affect general-equilibrium prices or allocations
(Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Sobel 2007).
2. Rotemberg (2011) explores other implications of fairness for pricing, such as price discrimination.
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3. Microevidence Supporting the Assumptions
This section presents microevidence in support of the assumptions underlying our
theory. First, we show that people care about the fairness of prices, and assess prices
that include low markups over marginal costs as fair. Second, we document that people
erroneously infer marginal costs from prices and thus misperceive markups. Finally,
we show that firms account for customers’ fairness concerns when setting prices.
3.1. Customers’ Fairness Concerns
Our theory assumes that customers find a price unfair when it entails a high markup
over marginal cost, and that they dislike such prices. Here we review evidence
supporting this assumption.
Price Increases Due to Higher Demand. Our assumption implies that people find
price increases unjustified by cost increases to be unfair. In a survey of Canadian
residents, Kahneman et al. (1986, p. 729) document this pattern. They describe the
following situation: “A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for $15. The
morning after a large snowstorm, the store raises the price to $20.” Among 107
respondents, only 18% regard this pricing as acceptable, whereas 82% regard it as
unfair.
Subsequent studies confirm and refine Kahneman et al.’s results. For example, in
a survey of 1,750 households in Switzerland and Germany, Frey and Pommerehne
(1993) confirm that customers dislike price increases that involve increased markups;
so too do Shiller et al. (1991) in a comparative survey of 391 respondents in Russia
and 361 in the United States.
The snow-shovel evidence leaves open the possibility that people find the price
increase unfair simply because it occurs during a period of hardship. To address this
question, Maxwell (1995) asks 72 students at a Florida university about price increases
following an ordinary increase in demand versus those following a hardship-driven
increase in demand. While more find price increases in the hardship environment
unfair (86% versus 69%), a substantial majority in each case perceive the price
increase as unfair.
Price Increases Due to Higher Costs. Conversely, our fairness assumption suggests
that customers tolerate price increases following cost increases so long as the markup
remains constant. Kahneman et al. (1986, pp. 732–733) identify this pattern: “Suppose
that, due to a transportation mixup, there is a local shortage of lettuce and the
wholesale price has increased. A local grocer has bought the usual quantity of lettuce
at a price that is 30 cents per head higher than normal. The grocer raises the price of
lettuce to customers by 30 cents per head.” Among 101 respondents, 79% regard the
pricing as acceptable, and only 21% find it unfair. In a survey of 307 Dutch individuals,
Gielissen et al. (2008, Table 2) also find that price increases following cost increases
are fair, while those following demand increases are not.
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on August 2020 using jeea.cls v1.0.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa041/5902391 by guest on 15 Septem
ber 2020
O
R
IG
IN
A
L
 U
N
E
D
IT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
Eyster et al. Pricing under Fairness Concerns 6
Price Decreases Allowed by Lower Costs. Our assumption equally implies that it
is unfair for firms not to pass along cost decreases. Kahneman et al. (1986, p. 734)
find milder support for this reaction. They describe the following situation: “A small
factory produces tables and sells all that it can make at $200 each. Because of changes
in the price of materials, the cost of making each table has recently decreased by $20.
The factory does not change its price of tables.” Only 47% of respondents find this
unfair, despite the elevated markup.
Subsequent studies, however, find that people do expect price reductions after cost
reductions. Kalapurakal et al. (1991) survey 189 US business students, asking them
to consider the following scenario: “A department store has been buying an oriental
floor rug for $100. The standard pricing practice used by department stores is to price
floor rugs at double their cost so the selling price of the rug is $200. This covers all the
selling costs, overheads and includes profit. The department store can sell all of the
rugs that it can buy. Suppose because of exchange rate changes the cost of the rug rises
from $100 to $120 and the selling price is increased to $220. As a result of another
change in currency exchange rates, the cost of the rug falls by $20 back to $100.”
Then two alternative scenarios were evaluated: “The department store continues to
sell the rug for $220” compared to “The department store reduces the price of the
rug to $200.” The latter was judged significantly fairer: the fairness rating was +2.3
instead of −0.4 (where −3 is extremely unfair and +3 extremely fair). Similarly, in
survey of US respondents, Konow (2001, Table 6) finds that if a factory that sells a
table at $150 locates a supplier charging $20 less for materials, the new fair price is
$138, well below $150.
Norms about Markups. Religious and legal texts written over the ages display a long
history of norms regarding markups—which suggests that people deeply care about
markups. For example, Talmudic law specifies that the highest fair and allowable
markup when trading essential items is 20% of the production cost, or one-sixth of
the final price (Friedman 1984, p. 198).
Another example comes from 18th-century France, where local authorities fixed
bread prices by publishing “fair” prices in official decrees. In the city of Rouen, for
instance, the official bread prices took the costs of grain, rent, milling, wood, and labor
into account, and granted a “modest profit” to the baker (Miller 1999, p. 36). Thus,
officials fixed the markup that bakers could charge. Even today, French bakers attach
such importance to convincing their customers of fair markups that their trade union
decomposes the cost of bread and the rationale for any price rise into minute detail
(https://perma.cc/GQ28-JMFC).
Two more examples come from regulation in the United States. First, return-on-
cost regulation for public utilities, which limits the markups charged by utilities, has
been justified not only on efficiency grounds but also on fairness grounds (Zajac 1985;
Jones and Mann 2001). Second, most US states have anti-price-gouging legislation
that limits the prices that firms can charge in periods of upheaval (such as an epidemic).
But by exempting price increases justified by higher costs, the legislation only outlaws
price increases caused by higher markups (Rotemberg 2009, pp. 74–77).
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Fairness and Willingness to Pay. We assume that customers who purchase a good at
an unfair price derive less utility from consuming it; as a result, unfair pricing reduces
willingness to pay. Substantial evidence documents that unfair prices make customers
angry, and more generally that unfair outcomes trigger feelings of anger (Rotemberg
2009, pp. 60–64). A small body of evidence also suggests that customers reduce
purchases when they feel unfairly treated. In a telephone survey of 40 US consumers,
Urbany et al. (1989) explore—by looking at a 25-cent ATM surcharge—whether a
price increase justified by a cost increase is perceived as more fair than an unjustified
one, and whether fairness perceptions affect customers’ propensity to buy. While 58%
of respondents judge the introduction of the surcharge fair when justified by a cost
increase, only 29% judge it fair when not justified (Table 1, panel B). Moreover, those
people who find the surcharge unfair are indeed more likely to switch banks (52%
versus 35%; see Table 1, panel C). Similarly, Piron and Fernandez (1995) present
survey and laboratory evidence that customers who find a firm’s actions unfair tend to
reduce their purchases with that firm.
Fixed Costs. A natural question is whether the fair price would differ from a
fair markup over marginal cost for businesses that have significant fixed costs.
The literature almost exclusively reports on experiments with marginal costs and
without fixed costs, so we cannot say how people would incorporate fixed costs into
the fair price. Anecdotal evidence, however, points towards people caring directly
about marginal costs. Ride-sharers outraged by Uber’s surge pricing seldom mention
that Uber has never reported a profit. Likewise, consumers deplore pharmaceutical
companies for selling pills with very low marginal costs at high markups, without
mention of R&D expenses. In light of the evidence, we focus on marginal costs and
abstract from fixed costs in the analysis.
3.2. Subproportional Inference of Costs
Because customers do not observe firms’ marginal costs, their fairness perceptions
depend upon their estimates of these costs. Since customers cannot easily learn about
hidden costs, however, they are prone to develop mistaken beliefs. To describe such
misperceptions, we assume subproportional inference. First, consumers underinfer
marginal costs from prices: their beliefs depend too much upon some anchor. Second,
insofar as consumers do update their beliefs about costs from prices, they engage in
a form of proportional thinking by estimating marginal costs that are proportional to
prices. We now review evidence that supports this pair of assumptions.
Underinference in General. Numerous experimental studies establish that people
underinfer other people’s information from those other people’s actions (Eyster 2019).
In the context of bilateral bargaining with asymmetric information, Samuelson and
Bazerman (1985), Holt and Sherman (1994), Carillo and Palfrey (2011), and others
show that bargainers underappreciate the adverse selection in trade. The papers
collected in Kagel and Levin (2002) present evidence that bidders underattend to
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the winner’s curse in common-value auctions. In a metastudy of social-learning
experiments, Weizsaecker (2010) finds that subjects behave as if they underinfer their
predecessors’ private information from their actions. In a voting experiment, Esponda
and Vespa (2014) show that people underinfer others’ private information from their
votes. Subproportional inference encompasses such underinference.
Underinference from Prices. Shafir et al. (1997) report survey evidence that points
at underinference in the context of pricing. They presented 362 people in New Jersey
with the following thought experiment: “Changes in the economy often have an
effect on people’s financial decisions. Imagine that the US experienced unusually
high inflation which affected all sectors of the economy. Imagine that within a six-
month period all benefits and salaries, as well as the prices of all goods and services,
went up by approximately 25%. You now earn and spend 25% more than before. Six
months ago, you were planning to buy a leather armchair whose price during the 6-
month period went up from $400 to $500. Would you be more or less likely to buy the
armchair now?” The higher prices were distinctly aversive: while 55% of respondents
were as likely to buy as before and 7% were more likely, 38% of respondents were less
likely to buy (p. 355). Our model makes this prediction. While consumers who update
subproportionally recognize that higher prices signal higher marginal costs, they stop
short of rational inference. Consequently, consumers perceive markups to be higher
when prices are higher. These consumers deem today’s transaction less fair, so they
have a lower willingness to pay for the armchair.
Proportional Thinking. A small body of evidence documents that people think
proportionally, even in settings that do not call for proportional thinking (Bushong
et al. 2020). In particular, Thaler (1980) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
demonstrate that people’s willingness to invest time in lowering the price of a good by
a fixed dollar amount depends negatively upon the good’s price. Rather than care about
the absolute savings, people appear to care about the proportional savings. Someone
who thinks about a price discount not in absolute terms but as a proportion of the
purchase price may think about marginal cost not in absolute terms but rather as a
percentage of price. If so, then the simplest assumption is that, insofar as the person
infers marginal cost from price, she infers a marginal cost proportional to price.
3.3. Firms’ Fairness Concerns
In our model, firms pay great attention to fairness when setting prices. This seems to
hold true in the real world: firms identify fairness as a major concern in price setting.
Surveys of Firms. Following Blinder et al. (1998), researchers have surveyed more
than 12,000 firms across developed economies about their pricing practices (Table 1).
The typical study asks managers to evaluate the relevance of different pricing theories
from the economics literature to explain their own pricing, in particular price rigidity.
Amongst the theories that the managers deem most important, some version of fairness
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TABLE 1. Description of firm surveys about pricing
Survey Country Period Number of firms
Blinder et al. (1998) United States (US) 1990–1992 200
Hall et al. (2000) United Kingdom (GB) 1995 654
Apel et al. (2005) Sweden (SE) 2000 626
Nakagawa et al. (2000) Japan (JP) 2000 630
Amirault et al. (2006) Canada (CA) 2002–2003 170
Kwapil et al. (2005) Austria (AT) 2004 873
Aucremanne and Druant (2005) Belgium (BE) 2004 1,979
Loupias and Ricart (2004) France (FR) 2004 1,662
Lunnemann and Matha (2006) Luxembourg (LU) 2004 367
Hoeberichts and Stokman (2006) Netherlands (NL) 2004 1,246
Martins (2005) Portugal (PT) 2004 1,370
Alvarez and Hernando (2005) Spain (ES) 2004 2,008
Langbraaten et al. (2008) Norway (NO) 2007 725
Olafsson et al. (2011) Iceland (IS) 2008 262
invariably appears, often called “implicit contracts” and described as follows: “firms
tacitly agree to stabilize prices, perhaps out of fairness to customers.” Indeed, fairness
appeals to firms more than any other theory, with a median rank of 1 and a mean rank
of 1.9 (Table 2). The second most popular explanation for price rigidity takes the form
of nominal contracts—prices do not change because they are fixed by contracts: it has
a median rank of 3 and a mean rank of 2.6. Two common macroeconomic theories
of price rigidity—menu costs and information delays—do not resonate at all with
firms, who rank them amongst the least popular theories, with mean and median ranks
above 9.
Firms also understand that customers bristle at unfair markups. According to
Blinder et al. (1998, pp. 153–157), 64% of firms say that customers do not tolerate
price increases after demand increases, while 71% of firms say that customers do
tolerate price increase after cost increases. And firms describe the norm for fair pricing
as a constant markup over marginal cost. Based on a survey of businessmen in the
United Kingdom, Hall and Hitch (1939, p. 19) report that the “the ‘right’ price, the
one which ‘ought’ to be charged” is widely perceived to be a markup (generally, 10%)
over average cost. Okun (1975, p. 362) also observes in discussions with business
people that “empirically, the typical standard of fairness involves cost-oriented pricing
with a markup.”
Survey of French Bakers. To better understand how firms incorporate fairness into
their pricing decisions, we interviewed 31 bakers in France in 2007. The French bread
market makes a good case study because the market is large; bakers set their prices
freely; and French people care enormously about bread.3 We sampled bakeries in
3. In 2005, bakeries employed 148,000 workers, for a yearly turnover of 3.2 billion euros (https:
//perma.cc/V679-UFE8). Since 1978, French bakers have been free to set their own prices, except during
the inflationary period 1979–1987 when price ceilings and growth caps were imposed. For centuries,
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Aix-en-Provence, Grenoble, Paimpol, and Paris. The interviews reveal that bakers are
guided by norms of fairness when they adjust prices to preserve customer loyalty. In
particular, cost-based pricing is widely used. Bakers only raise the price of bread in
response to increases in the cost of flour, utilities, or wages. They refuse to increase
prices in response to increased demand—during weekends, during the summer tourist
season, or during the holiday absences of local competitors. Bakers explained that
pricing otherwise would be unfair, and hence would anger and drive away customers.
4. Monopoly Model
We extend a simple model of monopoly pricing to include fairness concerns and
subproportional inference, along the lines described in Section 3. In this extended
model, the markup charged by the monopoly is lower. Furthermore, the markup
responds to marginal-cost shocks, generating some price rigidity: prices are not fixed,
but they respond less than one-for-one to marginal costs.
4.1. Assumptions
A monopoly sells a good to a representative customer. The monopoly cannot price-
discriminate, so each unit of good sells at the same price P. The customer cares about
fairness and appraises transactional fairness by assessing the markup charged by the
monopoly. Since the customer does not observe the marginal cost of production, she
needs to infer it from the price. We assume that the marginal cost perceived at price P is
given by a belief function Cp(P). For simplicity, we restrict Cp(P) to be deterministic.
Having inferred the marginal cost, the customer deduces that the markup charged by
the monopoly is
Mp(P) =
P
Cp(P)
.
The perceived markup determines the fairness of the transaction through a fairness
function F(Mp) > 0. Both functions Cp(P) and F(Mp) are assumed to be twice
differentiable.
A customer who buys the quantity Y of the good at price P experiences the
fairness-adjusted consumption
Z = F(Mp(P)) ·Y.
bread prices caused major social upheaval in France. Miller (1999, p. 35) explains that before the French
Revolution, “affordable bread prices underlay any hopes for urban tranquility.” During the Flour War of
1775, mobs chanted “if the price of bread does not go down, we will exterminate the king and the blood
of the Bourbons”; following these riots, “under intense pressure from irate and nervous demonstrators, the
young governor of Versailles had ceded and fixed the price ‘in the King’s name’ at two sous per pound,
the mythohistoric just price inscribed in the memory of the century” (Kaplan 1996, p. 12).
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on August 2020 using jeea.cls v1.0.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa041/5902391 by guest on 15 Septem
ber 2020
O
R
IG
IN
A
L
 U
N
E
D
IT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
Eyster et al. Pricing under Fairness Concerns 12
The customer also faces a budget constraint:
P ·Y +B =W,
where W > 0 designates initial wealth, and B designates remaining money balances.
Fairness-adjusted consumption and money balances enter a quasilinear utility function
ε
ε−1 ·Z
(ε−1)/ε +B,
where the parameter ε > 1 governs the concavity of the utility function. Given fairness
factor F and price P, the customer chooses purchases Y and money balances B to
maximize utility subject to the budget constraint.
Finally, the monopoly has constant marginal cost C > 0. It chooses price P and
output Y to maximize profits (P−C) ·Y subject to customers’ demand for its good.
4.2. Demand and Pricing
We begin by determining customers’ demand for the monopoly good. The customer
chooses purchases Y to maximize utility
ε
ε−1 (F ·Y )
(ε−1)/ε +W −P ·Y.
The maximum of the customer’s utility function is given by the following first-order
condition:
F (ε−1)/ε ·Y−1/ε = P.
This first-order condition yields the demand curve
Y d(P) = P−ε ·F(Mp(P))ε−1. (1)
The price affects demand through two channels: the typical substitution effect,
captured by P−ε ; and the fairness channel, captured by F(Mp(P))ε−1. The fairness
channel appears because the price influences the perceived markup and thus the
fairness of the transaction; this in turn affects the marginal utility of consumption
and demand.
We turn to the monopoly’s pricing. The monopoly chooses price P to maximize
profits (P−C) ·Y d(P). The first-order condition is
Y d(P)+(P−C) dY
d
dP
= 0.
We introduce the price elasticity of demand, normalized to be positive:
E =−d ln
(
Y d
)
d ln(P)
=− P
Y d
· dY
d
dP
.
The first-order condition then yields the classical result that
P =
E
E−1 ·C;
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that is, the monopoly optimally sets its price at a markup M =E/(E−1) over marginal
cost.4
To learn more about the monopoly’s markup, we compute the elasticity E. Using
(1), we find
E = ε+(ε−1) ·φ ·
[
1− d ln(C
p)
d ln(P)
]
, (2)
where φ = −d ln(F)/d ln(Mp) is the elasticity of the fairness function with respect
to the perceived markup, normalized to be positive. The first term, ε , describes
the standard substitution effect. The second term, (ε − 1) · φ · [1−d ln(Cp)/d ln(P)],
represents the fairness channel and splits into two subterms. The first subterm,
(ε − 1) ·φ , appears because a higher price mechanically raises the perceived markup
and thus reduces fairness. The second subterm, −(ε − 1) · φ · [d ln(Cp)/d ln(P)],
appears because a higher price conveys information about the marginal cost and thus
influences perceived markup and fairness. We now use (2) to compute the markup in
various situations.
4.3. No Fairness Concerns
Before studying the more realistic case with fairness concerns, we examine the
benchmark case in which customers do not care about fairness.
DEFINITION 1. Customers who do not care about fairness have a fairness function
F(Mp) = 1.
Without fairness concerns, the fairness function is constant, so its elasticity is
φ = 0. According to (2), the price elasticity of demand is constant: E = ε . This implies
that the optimal markup for the monopoly takes a standard value of ε/(ε−1).
Since the markup is independent of costs, changes in marginal cost are fully passed
through into the price; that is, prices are flexible. Formally, the cost passthrough is
β =
d ln(P)
d ln(C)
,
which measures the percentage change in price when the marginal cost increases by
1%. The passthrough takes the value of one because
P =
ε
ε−1 ·C.
The following lemma summarizes the results:
LEMMA 1. When customers do not care about fairness, the monopoly sets the
markup to M = ε/(ε−1), and the cost passthrough is β = 1.
4. In Online Appendix A, we use the assumptions on the belief and fairness functions introduced in the
next sections to verify that the first-order condition always gives the maximum of the monopoly’s profit
function.
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4.4. Fairness Concerns and Observable Costs
We now introduce fairness concerns. As a preliminary step to the analysis with
unobservable costs, we explore pricing when costs are observable.
To describe fairness concerns, we impose some structure on the fairness function.
DEFINITION 2. Customers who care about fairness have a fairness function F(Mp)
that is positive, strictly decreasing, and weakly concave on [0,Mh], where F(Mh) = 0
and Mh > ε/(ε−1).
The assumption that the fairness function strictly decreases in the perceived
markup captures the pattern that customers find higher markups less fair and resent
unfair transactions. The assumption that the fairness function is weakly concave means
that an increase in perceived markup causes a utility loss of equal magnitude (if F is
linear) or of greater magnitude (if F is strictly concave) than the utility gain caused
by an equal-sized decrease in perceived markup. We could not find evidence on this
assumption, but it seems natural that people are at least as outraged over a price
increase as they are happy about a price decrease of the same magnitude.
The properties in Definition 2 lead to the following results:
LEMMA 2. When customers care about fairness, the elasticity of the fairness
function
φ(Mp) =− d ln(F)
d ln(Mp)
is strictly positive and strictly increasing on (0,Mh), with limMp→0 φ(Mp) = 0 and
limMp→Mh φ(Mp) = +∞. As an implication, the superelasticity of the fairness function
σ =
d ln(φ)
d ln(Mp)
is strictly positive on (0,Mh).
The proof is simple algebra and relegated to Online Appendix A. The property
that the superelasticity of the fairness function is positive plays a central role in
the analysis. It means that the fairness function is more elastic at higher perceived
markups. This property follows from Definition 2 because a positive, decreasing, and
weakly concave function always has positive superelasticity.5
5. The concavity of the fairness function is not a necessary condition for the results in the paper: the
necessary condition is that the superelasticity of the fairness function is positive. This occurs with concave
functions but also with other not-too-convex functions. For example, the logistic function F(Mp) =
1/[1+(Mp)θ ] with θ > 0 is not concave but it has a positive superelasticity: σ = θ/[1+(Mp)θ ] > 0.
All the results would carry over with a logistic fairness function. We limit ourselves to concave fairness
functions instead of allowing for any fairness function with a positive superelasticity because we find such
restriction more natural and easier to interpret.
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Since the marginal cost is assumed to be observable, customers correctly perceive
marginal cost (Cp =C), so the perceived markup equals the true markup (Mp = M).
From (2), we see that the price elasticity of demand is E = ε +(ε − 1) · φ(M) > ε;
therefore, the markup charged by the monopoly satisfies
M = 1+
1
ε−1 ·
1
1+φ(M)
. (3)
Since φ(M) is strictly increasing from 0 to +∞ when M increases from 0 to Mh
(Lemma 2), the right-hand side of the equation is strictly decreasing from ε/(ε − 1)
to 1 when M increases from 0 to Mh > ε/(ε − 1) > 1. We infer that the fixed-point
equation (3) admits a unique solution, located between 1 and ε/(ε−1). Therefore, the
markup M is well-defined and M ∈ (1,ε/(ε−1)).
The next lemma records the results:
LEMMA 3. When customers care about fairness and observe costs, the monopoly’s
markup M is implicitly defined by (3). This implies that M ∈ (1,ε/(ε−1)) and the cost
passthrough is β = 1. Hence, the markup is lower than without fairness concerns, but
the cost passthrough is identical.
Without fairness concerns, the price affects demand solely through customers’
budget sets. With fairness concerns and observable marginal costs, the price also
influences the perceived fairness of the transaction: when the price is high relative
to marginal cost, customers deem the transaction to be less fair, which reduces the
marginal utility from consuming the good and hence demand. Consequently, the
monopoly’s demand is more price elastic than without fairness concerns, which forces
the monopoly to charge a lower markup.
However, (3) shows that with fairness concerns and observable costs, the markup
does not depend on costs, as in the absence of fairness concerns. Since changes in
marginal cost do not affect the markup, they are completely passed through into price:
prices remain flexible.
4.5. Fairness Concerns and Rational Inference of Costs
Next, we combine fairness concerns with unobservable marginal costs, beginning with
a final preliminary case in which customers rationally invert the price to uncover the
hidden marginal cost. In this case, the model takes the form of a simple signaling game
in which the monopoly learns its marginal cost and chooses a price, before customers
observe the monopoly’s price—but not its marginal cost—and formulate demand.
Let [0,Ch] be the set of all possible marginal costs for the monopoly. The
monopoly knows its marginal cost C ∈ [0,Ch], but customers do not; instead,
customers have non-atomistic prior beliefs over [0,Ch].
A pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this game comprises three
elements: a pure strategy for the monopolist, which is a mapping P : [0,Ch]→ R+
that selects a price for every possible value of marginal cost; a belief function for
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customers, which is a mapping Cp : R+ → [0,Ch] that determines a marginal cost
for every possible price; and a pure strategy for customers, which is a mapping
Y d : R+→ R+ that selects a quantity purchased for every possible price.6
We look for a PBE that is fully separating: the monopoly chooses different
prices for different marginal costs, which allows a rational customer who knows
the monopoly’s equilibrium strategy and observes the price to deduce marginal cost.
We claim the existence of a PBE in which the monopolist uses the strategy P(C) =
ε ·C/(ε−1); customers believe Cp(P) = (ε−1)P/ε if P∈P ≡ [0,εCh/(ε−1)], and
Cp(P) = 0 otherwise; and customers demand Y d(P) = P−ε ·F(P/Cp(P))ε−1. In such
a PBE, customers correctly infer marginal costs from prices on the equilibrium path
(P ∈P) and infer the worst from prices off the equilibrium path (P /∈P), namely
that the firm has zero marginal cost and infinitely high markup.
The argument proceeds in three steps. First, given their beliefs, customers’
demand is indeed optimal, as we have shown in (1). Second, given the monopolist’s
strategy, customers’ beliefs are indeed correct for any equilibrium price. Third, given
customers’ beliefs and demand, the monopolist’s strategy is optimal. Indeed, given
customers’ beliefs for P ∈P , we have d ln(Cp)/d ln(P) = 1. Then, according to (2)
(which is implied by customers’ strategy), the price elasticity of demand for any price
onP is E = ε . Hence, the monopolist optimally charges P= εC/(ε−1). Finally, the
monopoly has no incentive to charge some price not belonging to P , which would
lead customers to perceive an infinite markup, bringing the fairness factor, demand,
and profits to zero.
The following lemma records the findings:
LEMMA 4. When customers care about fairness and rationally infer costs, there is
a PBE in which the monopoly uses the markup M = ε/(ε − 1), and customers learn
marginal cost from price. In this PBE, the cost passthrough is β = 1. Hence, in this
PBE, the markup and cost passthrough are the same as without fairness concerns.
The lemma shows that when customers care about fairness and rationally infer
costs, there is a PBE in which fairness does not play a role. With fairness concerns, the
price affects demand not only by changing customers’ budget sets but also by changing
the perceived markup. In this equilibrium, however, after observing any price chosen
by the monopoly, customers perceive the same markup ε/(ε−1). The second channel
through which price could affect demand closes, so the monopoly sets the standard
markup ε/(ε − 1). Since the markup does not depend on marginal cost, changes in
marginal cost are fully passed through into prices: prices are flexible again.
Of course, there may exist other equilibria beside the one described in Lemma 4. A
pooling PBE may exist in which all types of the firm charge the same price P>Ch, and
consumers believe that a firm who prices otherwise has zero marginal cost. However,
6. Strictly speaking, Cp should allow the consumer to hold probabilistic beliefs about the firm’s marginal
cost given price, but we sidestep this subtlety because it does not affect our analysis.
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this and other non-fully-separating PBEs fail standard signaling refinements.7 Because
the linear PBE in Lemma 4 is so simple and robust, it is more plausible than
any alternative, which suggests that fairness is unlikely to matter when customers
rationally infer costs.
4.6. Fairness Concerns and Subproportional Inference of Costs
We turn to the main case of interest: customers care about fairness and
subproportionally infer costs from prices. In this case, the fairness function satisfies
Definition 2, and the belief function takes the following form:
DEFINITION 3. Customers who update subproportionally use the belief-updating
rule
Cp(P) =
(
Cb
)γ(ε−1
ε
P
)1−γ
, (4)
where Cb > (ε − 1) · (Mh)−1/γ ·C/ε is a prior point belief about marginal cost, and
γ ∈ (0,1] governs the extent to which beliefs anchor on that prior belief.
We have seen evidence that people do not sufficiently introspect about the
relationship between price and marginal cost, which leads them to underinfer the
information conveyed by the price, and that they tend to think proportionally. The
inference rule (4) geometrically averages no inference with proportional inference, so
it encompasses these two types of error.
First, customers underinfer marginal costs from price by clinging to their prior
belief Cb. The parameter γ ∈ (0,1] measures the degree of underinference. When
γ = 1, customers do not update at all about marginal cost based on price; they naively
maintain their prior belief Cb, irrespective of the price they observe. When γ ∈ (0,1),
customers do infer something from the price, but not enough.
Moreover, insofar as they infer something, they infer that marginal cost is
proportional to price, given by (ε − 1)P/ε . Such proportional inference represents
a second error: underinference pertains to how much customers infer, whereas
proportional inference describes what customers infer in as much as they do infer. The
updating rule has the property that in the limit as γ = 0, customers infer rationally.
Indeed, when γ = 0, the monopoly optimally sets the markup ε/(ε−1), which makes
(ε−1)P/ε the marginal cost at price P, and proportional inference agrees with rational
inference. When γ ∈ (0,1), however, the monopoly does not find it optimal to mark
up proportionally, and proportional inference becomes an error.
7. Only a separating PBE satisfies the D1 Criterion from Cho and Kreps (1987). Intuitively, consumers
ought to interpret a price P′ > P as coming from type C =Ch rather than type C = 0, which undermines
the pooling equilibrium. Indeed, if consumers demand no less at P′ than in equilibrium, then all types
of firm benefit from deviating; if consumers demand less at P′ than in equilibrium, then the highest-cost
firm strictly benefits whenever any other type of firm weakly benefits. On these grounds, the D1 Criterion
suggests that consumers should interpret P′ > P as coming from the highest marginal-cost firm.
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Last, we impose a constraint on the parameter Cb such that the perceived markup
falls below Mh when the firm prices at marginal cost; this is necessary for equilibrium
existence.
Despite its apparent arbitrary nature, the assumption of subproportional inference
has close ties to game-theoretic models of failure of contingent thinking. It is related to
the concept of cursed equilibrium, developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005), and to the
concept of analogy-based-expectation equilibrium, developed by Jehiel (2005) and
extended to Bayesian games by Jehiel and Koessler (2008). Both concepts propose
mechanisms that can be used to explain why people might fail to account for the
information that equilibrium prices reveal about marginal costs.8 Subproportional
inference is also related to the cursed-expectation equilibrium developed by Eyster
et al. (2019) as an alternative to rational-expectations equilibrium in markets.9
Subproportional inference also draws upon several well-documented psychologi-
cal biases. Customers in our model are coarse thinkers in the sense of Mullainathan
et al. (2008) because they do not distinguish between scenarios where price changes
reflect changes in cost and those where they reflect changes in markup. The underin-
ference could also be a form of the anchoring heuristic documented by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974): consumers understand that higher prices reflect higher marginal
costs but do not adjust sufficiently their estimate of the marginal cost. Altogether, the
updating rule (4) captures the well-known bias that people do not update their beliefs
sufficiently from available information.
Analytical Results. Plugging the belief-updating rule (4) into Mp = P/Cp gives the
following:
LEMMA 5. When customers update subproportionally, they perceive the monopoly’s
markup to be
Mp(P) =
(
ε
ε−1
)1−γ( P
Cb
)γ
,
which is a strictly increasing function of the observed price P.
8. In fact, with γ = 1, the beliefs given by (4) resemble those in a fully cursed equilibrium and the coarsest
analogy-based-expectation equilibrium, when recasting our model as a Bayesian game, as in Section 4.5.
In these equilibrium concepts, an unsophisticated household infers nothing about marginal cost from any
economic variable. Consequently, a consumer with average prior beliefs about marginal cost equal to Cb
would continue to perceive marginal costs with mean Cb given any price.
9. In a cursed-expectation equilibrium of a model in which traders endowed with private information
trade a risky asset, each trader forms an expectation about the value of the asset equal to a geometric
average of her expectation conditional upon her private signal alone and her expectation conditional
upon both her private signal and the market price. Traders’ expectations therefore take the form of a
weighted average of naive beliefs and correct beliefs. The two rules differ in that consumers in our model
average naive beliefs with a particular form of incorrect beliefs (proportional inference); to include rational
updating as a limit case, we calibrate the updating rule to match correct equilibrium beliefs for the case in
which all consumers are rational. We adopt this approach for its tractability.
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Customers appreciate that higher prices signal higher marginal costs. But by
underappreciating the strength of the relationship between price and marginal cost,
customers partially misattribute higher prices to higher markups. Consequently, they
regard higher prices as less fair.
As the belief function Mp(P) and fairness function F(Mp) are differentiable,
customers enjoy an infinitesimal price reduction as much as they dislike an
infinitesimal price increase. Therefore, the monopoly’s demand curve (1) has no kinks,
unlike in pricing theories based on loss aversion (Heidhues and Koszegi 2008).
Combining (2) and (4), we then find that the price elasticity of demand satisfies
E = ε+(ε−1) · γ ·φ(Mp). (5)
We have seen that without fairness concerns (φ = 0), or with rational inference (γ = 0),
the price elasticity of demand is constant, equal to ε . That result changes here. Since
γ > 0, the price elasticity of demand is always greater than ε . Moreover, since φ(Mp)
is increasing in Mp and Mp(P) in P, the price elasticity of demand is increasing
in P. These properties have implications for the markup charged by the monopoly,
M = E/(1−E).
PROPOSITION 1. When customers care about fairness and update subproportion-
ally, the monopoly’s markup M is implicitly defined by
M = 1+
1
ε−1 ·
1
1+ γφ(Mp(M ·C)) , (6)
which implies that M ∈ (1,ε/(ε−1)). Furthermore, the cost passthrough is given by
β = 1
/{
1+
γ2φσ
(1+ γφ) [ε+(ε−1)γφ ]
}
,
which implies that β ∈ (0,1). Hence, the markup is lower than without fairness
concerns or with rational inference; and unlike without fairness concerns or with
rational inference, the cost passthrough is incomplete.
The proof is relegated to Online Appendix A, but the intuition is simple. First,
when customers care about fairness but underinfer marginal costs, they become
more price-sensitive. Indeed, an increase in the price increases the opportunity cost
of consumption—as in the case without fairness—and also increases the perceived
markup, which reduces the marginal utility of consumption and therefore demand.
This heightened price-sensitivity raises the price elasticity of demand above ε and
pushes the markup below ε/(ε−1).
Second, after an increase in marginal cost, the monopoly optimally lowers its
markup. This occurs because customers underappreciate the increase in marginal cost
that accompanies a higher price. Since the perceived markup increases, the price
elasticity of demand increases. In response, the monopoly reduces its markup, which
mitigates the price increase. Thus, our model generates incomplete passthrough of
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marginal cost into price—a mild form of price rigidity. Furthermore, customers err in
believing that transactions are less fair when the marginal cost increases: transactions
actually become more fair.
Comparison with Microevidence. The result that prices do not fully respond to
marginal-cost shocks accords well with evidence on real firm behavior. First, using
matched data on product prices and producers’ unit labor cost in Sweden, Carlsson
and Skans (2012) find a passthrough of idiosyncratic marginal-cost changes into
prices of only 0.3. Second, using production data for Indian manufacturing firms,
De Loecker et al. (2016, Table 7) find that following trade liberalization in India,
marginal costs fell significantly due to the import tariff reduction, yet prices failed to
fall in step: they estimate passthroughs between 0.3 and 0.4. Third, using production
and cost data for Mexican manufacturing firms, Caselli et al. (2017, Table 7) also find
a modest passthrough of idiosyncratic marginal-cost changes into prices: between 0.2
and 0.4. Last, combining production data for US manufacturing firms with data on
energy prices and consumption, Ganapati et al. (2020, Tables 5 and 6) find a moderate
passthrough of marginal-cost changes caused by energy-price variations into prices:
between 0.5 and 0.7. Taking the midpoint estimates from the four studies, we find an
average passthrough of 0.3+ 0.35+ 0.3+ 0.6 = 0.4. Such cost passthrough is well
below 1.
Additionally, our theory predicts that when customers care about fairness, the
passthrough of marginal costs into prices is markedly different when costs are
observable and when they are not. The passthrough is one when costs are observable
(Lemma 3) but is strictly below one when costs are not observable (Proposition 1).
Kachelmeier et al. (1991a), Kachelmeier et al. (1991b), and Renner and Tyran (2004)
provide experimental evidence consistent with this result: they find that after a cost
shock, prices adjust more when costs are observable than when they are not.
Comparison with the Literature. Price rigidity in our model arises from a
nonconstant price elasticity of demand, which creates variation in markups after
cost shocks. Other models share the feature that variable price elasticity leads to
price rigidity. In international economics, these models have been used to explain
the behavior of exchange rates and prices (Dornbusch 1985; Bergin and Feenstra
2001; Atkeson and Burstein 2008). In macroeconomics, they have been used to create
real rigidities that amplify nominal rigidities (Kimball 1995; Dotsey and King 2005;
Eichenbaum and Fisher 2007). Unlike many of these models, our model does not make
reduced-form assumptions about the utility function or demand curve to generate a
nonconstant price elasticity of demand but instead provides a microfoundation.
Additional Analytical Results. To obtain further results, we introduce a simple
fairness function that satisfies all the requirements from Definition 2:
F(Mp) = 1−θ ·
(
Mp− ε
ε−1
)
, (7)
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where θ > 0 governs the intensity of fairness concerns. A higher θ means that a
consumer grows more upset when consuming an overpriced item and more content
when consuming an underpriced item. The fairness function reaches 1 when the
perceived markup equals ε/(ε − 1); then fairness-adjusted consumption coincides
with actual consumption. When the perceived markup exceeds ε/(ε−1), the fairness
function falls below one; and when the perceived markup lies below ε/(ε − 1), the
fairness function surpasses one.
Furthermore, to compare different industries or economies, we focus on a situation
in which customers have acclimated to prices by coming to judge firms’ markups as
acceptable: Cb adjusts so Mp = ε/(ε − 1) and F = 1. Acclimation is likely to occur
eventually within any industry or economy, once customers have faced the same prices
for a long time.10
We then obtain the following comparative statics:
COROLLARY 1. Assume that customers care about fairness according to the fairness
function (7), infer subproportionally, and are acclimated. Then the monopoly’s
markup is given by
M = 1+
1
(1+ γθ)ε−1 .
The markup decreases with the competitiveness of the market (ε), concern for fairness
(θ ), and degree of underinference (γ). And the cost passthrough is given by
β = 1
/{
1+
γ2θ [(1+θ)ε−1]
(ε−1)(1+ γθ) [(1+ γθ)ε−1]
}
.
The passthrough increases with the competitiveness of the market (ε); it decreases
with the concern for fairness (θ ) and degree of underinference (γ).
The proof is in Online Appendix A; it applies Proposition 1 to the fairness
function (7) under acclimation.
Comparison with Additional Microevidence. Our theory predicts that the cost
passthrough is higher in more-competitive markets. This property echoes the finding
by Carlton (1986) that prices are less rigid in less-concentrated industries. It is also
consistent with the finding by Amiti et al. (2014) that firms with higher market power
have a lower passthrough of cost shocks driven by exchange-rate fluctuations.
Our theory also predicts that the passthrough is lower—so prices are more
rigid—in markets that are more fairness-oriented. This property could contribute
10. As noted by Kahneman et al. (1986, p. 730), “Psychological studies of adaption suggest that any
stable state of affairs tends to become accepted eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it no
longer come to mind. Terms of exchange that are initially seen as unfair may in time acquire the status
of a reference transaction. . . . [People] adapt their views of fairness to the norms of actual behavior.” The
belief-updating rule (8) introduced in the New Keynesian model has the property that for any initial belief,
people eventually become acclimated.
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to explain the finding by Kackmeister (2007) that retail prices were more rigid in
1889–1891 than in 1997–1999. Kackmeister emphasizes that the relationship between
retailers and customers was much more personal in the 19th century than today.11
This more personal relationship could have made the retail sector more fairness-
oriented, which would help explain, according to our theory, its greater historical price
rigidity. This channel could also help explain the finding by Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008, Table 8) that prices are more rigid in the service sector than elsewhere, since
relationships between buyers and sellers are more personal in the service industry.
5. New Keynesian Model
We now explore the macroeconomic implications of the pricing theory developed in
Section 4. To that end, we embed it into a New Keynesian model as a substitute for
usual pricing frictions—either Calvo (1983) pricing or Rotemberg (1982) pricing. We
find that when customers care about fairness and infer subproportionally, the price
markup depends on the rate of inflation; thus, monetary policy is nonneutral in both
short and long run. (Derivations are relegated to Online Appendix B.)
5.1. Assumptions
A continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ [0,1] and a continuum of households indexed
by k ∈ [0,1] make up the economy. Firms use labor services to produce goods.
Households supply labor services, consume goods, and save using riskless nominal
bonds. Since goods are imperfect substitutes for one another, and labor services are
also imperfect substitutes, firms exercise some monopoly power on the goods market,
and households exercise some monopoly power on the labor market.
Fairness Concerns. Households cannot observe firms’ marginal costs. When a
household purchases good j at price Pj(t) in period t, it infers that firm j’s marginal
cost is Cpj (t). The model is dynamic so it provides a natural candidate for the
anchor that households use when inferring costs: last period’s perception of marginal
cost. Hence, instead of being given by (4) as in the monopoly model, households’
perception of firm j’s marginal cost at time t is given by
Cpj (t) =
[
Cpj (t−1)
]γ [ε−1
ε
Pj(t)
]1−γ
, (8)
where Cpj (t − 1) is last period’s perceived cost, and γ ∈ (0,1) is the degree of
underinference.
11. Kackmeister notes: “In 1889–1891 retailing often occurred in small one- or two-person shops,
retailers supplied credit to the customers, and retailers usually delivered the purchases to the customer’s
home at no extra charge. Today retailing occurs in large stores, a third party supplies credit, and the
customer takes his own items home. These changes decrease both the business and personal relationship
between the retailer and the customer” (p. 2008).
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Having inferred the marginal cost, households deduce that the markup charged by
firm j is Mpj (t) = Pj(t)/C
p
j (t). This perceived markup determines the fairness of the
transaction with firm j, measured by Fj(M
p
j (t)). The fairness function Fj, specific to
good j, satisfies the conditions listed in Definition 2. The elasticity of Fj with respect
to Mpj is φ j =−d ln(Fj)/d ln(Mpj ).
An amount Yjk(t) of good j bought by household k at a unit price Pj(t) yields a
fairness-adjusted consumption
Z jk(t) = Fj(M
p
j (Pj(t))) ·Yjk(t).
Household k’s fairness-adjusted consumption of the various goods aggregates into a
consumption index
Zk(t) =
[∫ 1
0
Z jk(t)(ε−1)/ε d j
]ε/(ε−1)
,
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different goods. The price of one
unit of the consumption index at time t is given by the price index
X(t) =

∫ 1
0
[
Pj(t)
Fj(M
p
j (Pj(t)))
]1−ε
d j

1/(1−ε)
.
Households. Household k derives utility from consuming goods and disutility from
working. Its expected lifetime utility is
E0
∞
∑
t=0
δ t
[
ln(Zk(t))− Nk(t)
1+η
1+η
]
,
where Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on time-t information, δ ∈ (0,1)
is the discount factor, Nk(t) is its labor supply, and η > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply.
To smooth consumption over time, households trade one-period bonds. In period t,
household k holds Bk(t) bonds. Bonds purchased in period t have a price Q(t), mature
in period t+1, and pay one unit of money at maturity.
Household k’s consumption-savings decisions in each period t must obey the
constraint ∫ 1
0
Pj(t)Yjk(t)d j+Q(t)Bk(t) =Wk(t)Nk(t)+Bk(t−1)+Vk(t),
where Wk(t) is the wage rate for labor service k, and Vk(t) are dividends from firm
ownership. In addition, household k satisfies a solvency constraint that prevents Ponzi
schemes.
Finally, in each period t, household k chooses purchases Yjk(t) for each j ∈ [0,1],
labor supply Nk(t), bond holdings Bk(t), and wage rate Wk(t). The household’s
objective is to maximize its expected utility subject to the budget constraint, to the
solvency constraint, and to firms’ demand for labor service k. The household takes as
given its initial endowment of bonds Bk(−1), all fairness factors Fj(t), all prices Pj(t)
and Q(t), and dividends Vk(t).
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on August 2020 using jeea.cls v1.0.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa041/5902391 by guest on 15 Septem
ber 2020
O
R
IG
IN
A
L
 U
N
E
D
IT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
Eyster et al. Pricing under Fairness Concerns 24
Firms. Firm j hires labor to produce output using the production function
Yj(t) = A j(t)N j(t)α , (9)
where Yj(t) is output of good j, A j(t) > 0 is its technology level, α ∈ (0,1] is the
extent of diminishing marginal returns to labor, and
N j(t) =
[∫ 1
0
N jk(t)(ν−1)/ν dk
]ν/(ν−1)
is an employment index. In the index, N jk(t) is the quantity of labor service k hired
by firm j, and ν > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different labor services.
The technology level A j(t) is stochastic and unobservable to households—making the
firm’s marginal cost unobservable.
Each period t, firm j chooses output Yj(t), price Pj(t), and employment levels
N jk(t) for all k ∈ [0,1]. The firm’s objective is to maximize the expected present-
discounted value of profits
E0
∞
∑
t=0
Γ(t)
[
Pj(t)Yj(t)−
∫ 1
0
Wk(t)N jk(t)dk
]
,
where Γ(t) is the stochastic discount factor for period-t nominal payoffs, subject to
the production constraint (9), to demand for good j, and to the law of motion of the
perceived marginal cost (8). The firm takes as given the initial belief about its marginal
cost Cpj (−1), all wage rates Wk(t), and discount factors Γ(t). Its profits accrue to
households as dividends.
Monetary Policy. The nominal interest rate is determined by a simple monetary-
policy rule:
i(t) = i0(t)+ψpi(t), (10)
where i0(t) is a stochastic exogenous component, pi(t) is the inflation rate, and ψ > 1
governs the response of the interest rate to inflation.
Symmetry. We assume a symmetric economy. All households receive the same bond
endowment B(−1) and same dividends V (t). All firms share a common technology
A(t), face the same fairness function F , and are believed to have the same initial cost
Cp(−1). Hence, all households behave identically, as do all firms.
Notation. Since the equilibrium is symmetric, we drop subscripts j and k to denote
the equilibrium values taken by the variables. We also denote the steady-state value
of any variable H(t) by H. And for any variable H(t) except the inflation and interest
rates, we denote the logarithmic deviation from steady state by ĥ(t) ≡ ln(H(t))−
ln(H). For the inflation and interest rates, we denote the deviation from steady state
by pi(t)≡ pi(t)−pi , î0(t)≡ i0(t)− i0, and î(t)≡ i(t)− i.
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5.2. Demand for Goods and Pricing
Households and firms behave exactly as in the textbook New Keynesian model, except
that fairness concerns modify consumers’ demand and, consequently, firms’ pricing.
The demand for good j from all households is
Y d
(
t,Pj(t),C
p
j (t−1)
)
= Z(t)
[
Pj(t)
X(t)
]−ε
F
((
ε
ε−1
)1−γ [ Pj(t)
Cpj (t−1)
]γ)ε−1
,
where Z(t) =
∫ 1
0 Zk(t)dk describes the level of aggregate demand. The price of good j
appears twice in the demand curve: as part of the relative price Pj/X ; and as part of
the fairness factor F . This second element leads to unconventional pricing.
As in the monopoly model, fairness affects pricing through the price elasticity of
demand E, which satisfies (5). Unlike in the monopoly model, however, the profit-
maximizing markup is not E/(E − 1) because E does not capture the effect of the
current price on future beliefs and thus future demands. Instead, in equilibrium, firms
set their price markup M such that
M(t)−1
M(t)
E(t) = 1−δγ+δ Et
(
M(t+1)−1
M(t+1)
[E(t+1)− (1− γ)ε]
)
. (11)
The gap between M(t) and E(t)/[E(t)− 1] reflects how much today’s price affects
future perceived marginal costs, demands, and profits. Conversely, if firms do not care
about the future (δ = 0), the equation reduces to M(t) = E(t)/[E(t)−1].
The price markup plays a critical role because it directly determines employment:
N(t) =
[
(ν−1)α
ν
· 1
M(t)
]1/(1+η)
. (12)
Employment is strictly decreasing in the price markup because in equilibrium the
price markup is the inverse of the real marginal cost, which is itself increasing in
employment. Since a higher price markup implies a lower real marginal cost, it also
implies lower employment.
5.3. Calibration
Before simulating the model, we calibrate it to US data. To set the values of
the fairness-related parameters, we use new evidence on price markups and cost
passthroughs. For the other parameters, we rely on standard evidence. The calibrated
values of the parameters are summarized in Table 3.
Fairness Function. We set the shape of the fairness function F to (7). This simple
functional form has two advantages. First, it introduces only one new parameter, θ >
0, which governs the concern for fairness. Second, it produces a fairness factor equal
to one at the zero-inflation steady state. Indeed, in such steady state, the perceived
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TABLE 3. Parameter values in simulations
Value Description Source or target
A. Common parameters
δ = 0.99 Quarterly discount factor Annual rate of return = 4%
α = 1 Shape of production function Labor share = 2/3
η = 1.1 Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply Chetty et al. (2013, Table 2)
ψ = 1.5 Response of nominal interest rate to inflation Gali (2008, p. 52)
µ i = 0.75 Persistence of monetary shock Gali (2008, p. 52), Gali (2011, p. 26)
µa = 0.9 Persistence of technology shock Gali (2008, p. 55)
B. Parameters of the New Keynesian model with fairness
ε = 2.23 Elasticity of substitution across goods Steady-state price markup = 1.5
θ = 9 Fairness concern Instantaneous cost passthrough = 0.4
γ = 0.8 Degree of underinference Two-year cost passthrough = 0.7
C. Parameters of the textbook New Keynesian model
ε = 3 Elasticity of substitution across goods Steady-state price markup = 1.5
ξ = 0.67 Share of firms keeping price unchanged Average price duration = 3 quarters
Notes: The parameter values described in the table are obtained in Section 5.3.
price markup is Mp = P/Cp = ε/(ε − 1), as shown by (8), and so the fairness factor
is F = 1. Thus, with no trend inflation, customers acclimate and are neither happy nor
unhappy about markups.
Fairness-Related Parameters. We then calibrate the three parameters central to our
theory: the fairness parameter θ , the inference parameter γ , and the elasticity of
substitution across goods ε . These parameters jointly determine the average value of
the price markup and its response to shocks—which determines the cost passthrough.
Hence, for the calibration, we match evidence on price markups and cost passthroughs.
We target three empirical moments: average price markup, short-run cost passthrough,
and long-run cost passthrough.
First, using firm-level data, De Loecker et al. (2020, p. 575) estimate price markups
in the United States. They find that the average markup across the US economy hovers
between 1.2 and 1.3 in the 1955–1980 period, rises from 1.2 in 1980 to 1.5 in 2000,
remains around 1.5 until 2014, before spiking to 1.6 in 2016. As the markup averages
1.5 between 2000 and 2016, we adopt this value as a target.12
12. The aggregate markup computed by De Loecker et al. (2020) is commensurate to markups measured
in specific industries and goods in the United States. In the automobile industry, Berry et al. (1995, p. 882)
estimate that on average (P−C)/P= 0.239, which translates into a markup of M =P/C= 1/(1−0.239)=
1.3. In the ready-to-eat cereal industry, Nevo (2001, Table 8) finds that a median estimate of (P−C)/P
is 0.372, which translates into a markup of M = P/C = 1/(1− 0.372) = 1.6. In the coffee industry,
Nakamura and Zerom (2010, Table 6) also estimate a markup of 1.6. For most national-brand items retailed
in supermarkets, Barsky et al. (2003, p. 166) discover that markups range between 1.4 and 2.1. Finally,
earlier work surveyed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995, pp. 260–267) finds similar markups: between
1.2 and 1.7 in the industrial-organization literature, and around 2 in the marketing literature.
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Second, in the United States, Sweden, India, and Mexico, the short-run cost
passthrough is estimated between 0.2 and 0.7, with an average value of 0.4
(Section 4.6). Hence, we target a short-run cost passthrough of 0.4.
Third, Burstein and Gopinath (2014, Table 7.4) provide estimates of the long-
run exchange-rate passthrough for the United States and seven other countries. The
exchange-rate passthrough measures the response of import prices to exchange-rate
shocks. Its level may not reflect that of the cost passthrough, because marginal costs
may not vary one-for-one with exchange rates, but there is no reason for the two
passthroughs to have different dynamics (Amiti et al. 2014). The immediate exchange-
rate passthrough is estimated at 0.4, and the two-year exchange-rate passthrough
at 0.7. Based on these dynamics, and the fact that the immediate cost passthrough
is also 0.4, we target a two-year cost passthrough of 0.7.
We then simulate the dynamics of a firm’s price in response to an unexpected
and permanent increase in its marginal cost (see Online Appendix B.5). We find that
the fairness parameter θ primarily affects the level of the cost passthrough, while the
inference parameter γ primarily affects its persistence. Based on the simulations, we
set ε = 2.23, θ = 9, and γ = 0.8. This calibration allows us to achieve a steady-state
price markup of 1.5, an instantaneous cost passthrough of 0.4, and a two-year cost
passthrough of 0.7.
Other Parameters. We set the labor-supply parameter to η = 1.1, which gives a
Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 1/1.1= 0.9. This value is the median microestimate
of the Frisch elasticity for aggregate hours (Chetty et al. 2013, Table 2). We then set the
quarterly discount factor to δ = 0.99, giving an annual rate of return on bonds of 4%.
We set the production-function parameter to α = 1. This calibration guarantees that
the labor share, which equals α/M in steady state, takes its conventional value of 2/3.
Last, we calibrate the monetary-policy parameter to ψ = 1.5, which is consistent with
observed variations in the federal funds rate (Gali 2008, p. 52).
Parameters of the Textbook New Keynesian Model. We also calibrate a textbook
New Keynesian model (described in Online Appendix C), which we will use as a
benchmark in simulations. For the parameters common to the two models, we use the
same values—except for ε . In the textbook model, the steady-state price markup is
ε/(ε−1), so we set ε = 3 to obtain a markup of 1.5.
We also need to calibrate a parameter specific to the textbook model: ξ , which
governs price rigidity. To generate price rigidity, the New Keynesian literature uses
either the staggered pricing of Calvo (1983) or the price-adjustment cost of Rotemberg
(1982). Both pricing assumptions lead to the same linearized Phillips curve around the
zero-inflation steady state, and therefore to the same simulations (Roberts 1995). But
the Calvo interpretation of ξ is easier to map to the data, so we use it for calibration.
The parameter ξ indicates the share of firms that cannot update their price each period;
it can be calibrated from microevidence on the frequency of price adjustments. If a
share ξ of firms keep their price fixed each period, the average duration of a price spell
is 1/(1− ξ ) (Gali 2008, p. 43). In the microdata underlying the US Consumer Price
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Index, the mean duration of price spells is about 3 quarters (Nakamura and Steinsson
2013, Table 1). Hence, we set 1/(1−ξ ) = 3, which implies ξ = 0.67.
5.4. Effects of Monetary Policy in the Short Run
Price rigidity is a central concept in macroeconomic theory because it is a source of
monetary nonneutrality. Here we explore how our pricing theory produces monetary
nonneutrality. At this stage, we focus on the short-run effects of monetary policy,
tracing how an unexpected and transitory shock to monetary policy permeates through
the economy.
Analytical Results. The dynamics of the textbook New Keynesian model around the
steady state are governed by an IS equation, describing households’ consumption-
savings decisions, and a short-run Phillips curve, describing firms’ pricing decisions.
In the model with fairness, the same IS equation remains valid, but the Phillips curve
is modified—because firms price differently.13
The main difference is that the Phillips curve involves not only employment and
inflation but also the perceived price markup, which itself obeys the following law of
motion:
LEMMA 6. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the perceived price markup
evolves according to
m̂p(t) = γ
[
pi(t)+ m̂p(t−1)
]
. (13)
Hence, the perceived price markup is a discounted sum of lagged inflation terms:
m̂p(t) =
∞
∑
s=0
γs+1pi(t− s).
The proof appears in Online Appendix B.4; it is obtained by reworking the
inference rule (8).
Equation (13) shows that the perceived price markup today tends to be high if
inflation is high or if the past perceived markup was high. Past beliefs matter because
people use them as a basis for their current beliefs. Inflation matters because people
do not fully appreciate the effect of inflation on nominal marginal costs. Because of
its autoregressive structure, the perceived price markup is fully determined by past
inflation.
13. Introducing fairness concerns into the New Keynesian model improves the realism of the Phillips
curve but does not modify the IS equation. Yet the IS equation is also problematic: it notably creates
several anomalies at the zero lower bound. Other behavioral elements have been introduced into the
New Keynesian model to improve the realism of the IS equation. For instance, Gabaix (2020) assumes
that households are inattentive to unusual events. Alternatively, Michaillat and Saez (2019) assume that
households derive utility from social status, which is measured by relative wealth.
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As a result, the short-run Phillips curve involves not only forward-looking
elements—expected future inflation and employment—but also backward-looking
elements—past inflation.
PROPOSITION 2. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the short-run Phillips
curve is
(1−δγ)m̂p(t)−λ1n̂(t) = δγEt(pi(t+1))−λ2Et(n̂(t+1)), (14)
where
λ1 ≡ (1+η)ε+(ε−1)γφγφσ
[
1+
(1−δ )γ
1−δγ φ
]
λ2 ≡ (1+η)δ ε+(ε−1)φφσ
[
1+
(1−δ )γ
1−δγ φ
]
.
Accordingly, the short-run Phillips curve is hybrid, including both past and future
inflation rates:
(1−δγ)
∞
∑
s=0
γs+1pi(t− s)−λ1n̂(t) = δγEt(pi(t+1))−λ2Et(n̂(t+1)).
The proof appears in Online Appendix B.4. It is obtained by log-linearizing firms’
pricing equation (11) around the steady state, and combining it with (12)—to link the
price markup to employment—and with (5) and (13)—to link the price elasticity of
demand to inflation.
Simulation Results. Next we simulate the dynamical response of our calibrated
model to an unexpected and transitory monetary shock. Following the literature, we
simulate dynamics around the zero-inflation steady state.
We assume that the exogenous component i0(t) of the monetary-policy rule (10)
follows an AR(1) process such that
î0(t) = µ i · î0(t−1)−ζ i(t),
where the disturbance ζ i(t) follows a white-noise process with mean zero, and
µ i ∈ (0,1) governs the persistence of shocks. We set µ i = 0.75, which corresponds
to moderate persistence (Gali 2008, p. 52; Gali 2011, p. 26). We simulate the response
to an initial disturbance of ζ i(0) = 0.25%, which is an expansionary monetary shock.
Without any inflation response, this shock would reduce the annualized interest rate
by 1 percentage point.
Figure 1 depicts the dynamical response to the expansionary monetary shock.
The exogenous component of monetary policy and inflation rate are expressed as
deviations from steady-state values, measured in percentage points and annualized
(by multiplying by four the variables î0(t) and pi(t)); all other variables are expressed
as percentage deviations from steady-state values.
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FIGURE 1. Effects of an expansionary monetary shock. This figure describes the response of the
New Keynesian model with fairness (solid lines) to a decrease in the exogenous component of the
monetary-policy rule (10) by 1 percentage point (annualized) at time 0. The exogenous component
of monetary policy and inflation rate are deviations from steady state, measured in percentage points
and annualized. The other variables are percentage deviations from steady state. For comparison,
the figure also displays the response of the textbook New Keynesian model (dashed lines). The log-
linearized equilibrium conditions used in the simulation of the model with fairness are presented in
Online Appendix B.4; those used in the simulation of the textbook model are in Online Appendix C.
The calibration of the two models is described in Table 3.
Loosening monetary policy raises inflation. Observing higher prices, customers
underinfer the underlying increase in nominal marginal costs and thus perceive higher
price markups. Firms respond to such perceptions by cutting their actual markups. The
price markup falls by 1.4%, which raises output and employment by 0.7%. (Output
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TABLE 4. Opinions about price movements in Japan, 2001–2017
Opinion about perceived price change
Perceived price change Respondents Favorable Neutral Unfavorable
Prices have gone up 68,491 2.5% 13.0% 83.7%
Prices have gone down 18,257 43.0% 34.2% 21.9%
Notes: Data come from the 60 waves of the Opinion Survey on the General Public’s Mindset and Behavior
conducted by the Bank of Japan between September 2001 and December 2017. (Earlier data is not online and
has therefore been excluded.) The survey was conducted quarterly on a random sample of 4,000 adults living in
Japan, with a 57.2% average response rate. Respondents answered the following question: “How do you think
prices (defined as overall prices of goods and services you purchase) have changed compared with one year
ago?” (question 10, 11, 12, or 13, depending on the survey). Respondents who answered “prices have gone up
significantly” or “prices have gone up slightly” are described on the first row of the table. Respondents who
answered “prices have gone down significantly” or “prices have gone down slightly” are described on the second
row of the table. The remainder, who answered “prices have remained almost unchanged,” do not feature in the
table. Those who answered that prices had gone up then answered “How would you describe your opinion of the
price rise?” (question 10, 11, 12, or 13, depending on the survey, and only after June 2004). The third column
gives the share of those respondents who answered “rather favorable,” the fourth column the share who answered
“neither favorable nor unfavorable,” and the fifth column the share who answered “rather unfavorable.” Those
who answered that prices had gone down then answered “How would you describe your opinion of the price
decline?” (question 10, 11, 12, 13, or 15, depending on the survey). The third, fourth, and fifth column give the
share of those respondents who answered “rather favorable,” “neither favorable nor unfavorable,” and “rather
unfavorable.” Detailed survey results are available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/o_survey/index.htm/.
and employment respond identically because the production function is calibrated to
be linear.)
Comparison with Microevidence. In our model, when consumers observe inflation,
they misperceive price markups as higher and transactions as less fair, which lowers
their consumption utility and triggers a feeling of displeasure. The survey responses
collected by Shiller (1997) agree with these predictions. Among 120 respondents
in the United States, 85% report that they dislike inflation because when they “go
to the store and see that prices are higher,” they “feel a little angry at someone”
(p. 21). The most common perceived culprits are “manufacturers,” “store owners,” and
“businesses,” whose transgressions include “greed” and “corporate profits” (p. 25).
Thus, in our model as in the real world, consumers perceive higher markups during
inflationary periods and are angered by them.
Conversely, upon observing deflation, consumers in the model would believe
that price markups are lower and transactions more fair, which would boost their
consumption utility and trigger a feeling of happiness. Hence, our model predicts not
only that consumers dislike inflation, but also that they enjoy deflation. An opinion poll
conducted by the Bank of Japan between 2001 and 2017 paints this pattern (Table 4).
During this period, Japan alternated between inflation and deflation. Of the 68,000
respondents facing price increases, only 3% see that as a favorable development,
whereas 84% see it as unfavorable. In contrast, of the 18,000 respondents facing price
decreases, 43% regard that as a favorable development, and only 22% regard it as
unfavorable.
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Comparison with Macroevidence. Monetary policy is nonneutral in the model
because monetary shocks influence output and employment. The nonneutrality of
monetary policy is well documented; the evidence is summarized by Christiano et al.
(1999) and Ramey (2016, Section 3). Furthermore, the effect of monetary policy is
mediated by a hybrid Phillips curve, which is realistic as both past inflation and
expected future inflation enter significantly in estimated New Keynesian Phillips curve
(Mavroeidis et al. 2014, Table 2).
In fact the response of output to a monetary shock is broadly the same in the
model as in US data. First, the shape of the response is similar, as output is estimated
to respond to monetary shocks in a hump-shaped fashion (Ramey 2016, Figures 1–4).
Second, the amplitude of the response is comparable. After a one-percentage-point
decrease of the nominal interest rate, the literature estimates that output increases
between 0.6% and 5%, with a median value of 1.6% (Ramey 2016, Table 1); and
using a range of methods and samples, Ramey (2016, Table 2) estimates that output
increases between 0.2% and 2.2%, with a median value of 0.8%. In our simulation,
output rises by 0.7% when the exogenous component of monetary policy decreases
by 1 percentage point—close to Ramey’s median estimate.
After a monetary shock, price markup and output move in opposite directions;
the same would be true after other aggregate-demand shocks. Moreover, aggregate-
demand shocks explain most business-cycle fluctuations (Gali 1999; Basu et al. 2006).
Accordingly, our model predicts that price markups are countercyclical. And indeed,
price markups seem countercyclical in the data (Rotemberg and Woodford 1999; Bils
et al. 2018).
The main discrepancy between our model and US evidence concerns inflation.
Whereas inflation in the United States responds in a delayed and gradual way to
monetary shocks (Ramey 2016, Figures 1–4), both our model and the textbook model
predict an immediate response.
Comparison with the Textbook New Keynesian Model. In both our model and the
textbook model, looser monetary policy leads to higher inflation and lower markups,
boosting employment and output. Beyond these similarities, the two models differ on
several counts.
First, the textbook model’s short-run Phillips curve is purely forward-looking, so
it does not include the backward-looking elements found in US data and present in the
fairness model. Of course, other variations of the textbook model append backward-
looking components to the Phillips curve; for example, having firms index their prices
to past inflation in periods when they cannot reset their prices (Christiano et al. 2005).
Second, the textbook model cannot produce the positive correlation between
perceived price markup and inflation that occurs in the fairness model, and that
rationalizes the survey findings by Shiller (1997) and the Bank of Japan. This is
because households in the textbook model correctly infer that price markups are lower
when they see higher inflation.
Third, the textbook model cannot produce the hump-shaped response of output
observed in US data and predicted by the fairness model, since it does not include
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on August 2020 using jeea.cls v1.0.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvaa041/5902391 by guest on 15 Septem
ber 2020
O
R
IG
IN
A
L
 U
N
E
D
IT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
Eyster et al. Pricing under Fairness Concerns 33
any backward-looking element. The fairness model, by contrast, includes a backward-
looking element in the form of the perceived price markup m̂p(t), which enters the
Phillips curve (14) and depends on the past via (13). It is well understood that hump-
shaped impulse responses can be obtained by inserting backward-looking elements—
for instance, by assuming that consumers form habits (Fuhrer 2000; Christiano
et al. 2005). Under that assumption, consumers’ behavior depends on their past
consumption, which then enters the IS curve and generates hump-shaped responses.
Fourth, the response of output in the textbook model is about one third the size
of that in the fairness model, and much smaller than in US data. Despite both models
being calibrated through microevidence on price dynamics, monetary shocks are more
amplified in the fairness model.
5.5. Effects of Technology Shocks
The price rigidity arising from fairness concerns allows monetary policy to influence
real variables such as employment and output. It also affects the transmission of
nonpolicy shocks to the economy. Here we illustrate the effects of a technology
shock—the most widely studied nonpolicy shock in modern macroeconomics—on
the economy.
Simulation Results. We simulate the dynamical response of our calibrated model to
an unexpected and transitory technology shock, once again around the zero-inflation
steady state. We assume that the logarithm of technology A(t) in the production
function (9) follows an AR(1) process such that
â(t) = µa · â(t−1)+ζ a(t),
where the disturbance ζ a(t) follows a white-noise process with mean zero, and
µa ∈ (0,1) governs the persistence of shocks. We set µa = 0.9, which is typical (Gali
2008, p. 55). We simulate the response to an initial disturbance of ζ a(0) = 1%.
Figure 2 displays the response to the positive technology shock. The inflation
rate is expressed as a deviation from its steady-state value, measured in percentage
points and annualized (by multiplying by four the variable pi(t)); all other variables
are expressed as percentage deviations from their steady-state values.
The increase in technology reduces marginal costs, pulling down inflation.
Observing lower prices, customers underinfer the underlying decrease in marginal
costs and thus perceive lower price markups and fairer transactions. The improvement
in perceived fairness decreases the price elasticity of the demand for goods. Firms
best respond by raising their markups. The price markup increases by 1.3% at the
peak, which depresses employment by 0.7%. Despite the drop in employment, output
initially increases by 0.5% due to improved technology.
Comparison with Macroevidence. In our model, an increase in technology leads
to higher output but lower employment. This prediction conforms to much of the
evidence from US data (Gali and Rabanal 2005; Basu et al. 2006; Francis and Ramey
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FIGURE 2. Effects of a positive technology shock. This figure describes the response of the New
Keynesian model with fairness (solid lines) to a 1% increase in technology at time 0. The inflation
rate is a deviation from steady state, measured in percentage points and annualized. The other
variables are percentage deviations from steady state. For comparison, the figure also displays
the response of the textbook New Keynesian model (dashed lines). The log-linearized equilibrium
conditions used in the simulation of the model with fairness are presented in Online Appendix B.4;
those used in the simulation of the textbook model are in Online Appendix C. The calibration of the
two models is described in Table 3.
2009). Our model also predicts that inflation falls after the increase in technology, as
documented by Basu et al. (2006, Figure 4). Finally, in the model, price markups and
output are positively correlated under technology shocks. Nekarda and Ramey (2013)
report evidence consistent with this prediction.
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Comparison with the Textbook New Keynesian Model. The similarities and
differences between the two models identified under monetary shocks also apply under
technology shocks. The two models predict the same direction of change in inflation,
price markup, employment, and output. There are three main differences. First,
the fairness model produces a hump-shaped response of employment to technology
shocks, which the textbook model does not. Second, the fairness model produces
a negative correlation between perceived and actual price markups, whereas the
textbook model does not distinguish between the two. Last, in response to a positive
technology shock, employment falls more in the fairness model than in the textbook
model; consequently, output increases less in the fairness model than in the textbook
model.
5.6. Effects of Monetary Policy in the Long Run
Our pricing theory implies that monetary policy is nonneutral in the short run, so a
transitory monetary shock affects employment. Here we develop another implication
of the theory: monetary policy is nonneutral in the long run, so a change in the
steady-state inflation rate affects steady-state employment. Thus, the theory generates
a nonvertical long-run Phillips curve.
We study the long-run effects of monetary policy by comparing the steady-
state equilibria induced by different values of the exogenous component i0 in the
monetary-policy rule (10). In steady state the real interest rate equals the discount rate
ρ ≡− ln(δ ); therefore, by choosing i0, monetary policy perfectly controls steady-state
inflation:
pi =
ρ− i0
ψ−1 .
To obtain zero inflation, it suffices to set i0 = ρ; to obtain higher inflation, it suffices
to reduce i0.
Acclimation. Kahneman et al. (1986, p. 730) hypothesize that “any stable state of
affairs tends to become accepted eventually”. We adapt their idea by assuming that
people partially acclimate to the steady-state inflation rate, generalizing the fairness
function (7) to
F(Mp) = 1−θ · (Mp−M f ), (15)
where M f is the fair markup resulting from acclimation. We assume that the fair
markup is the weighted average of the standard markup ε/(ε−1) and the steady-state
perceived markup Mp:
M f = χ ·Mp+(1−χ) · ε
ε−1 . (16)
The parameter χ ∈ [0,1] measures acclimation: when χ = 0, there is no acclimation;
when χ = 1, there is full acclimation, so people do not mind whatever is happening in
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steady state; when χ ∈ (0,1), people may be permanently satisfied or dissatisfied in
steady state, but less than when χ = 0.14
Analytical Results. In steady state, the rate of inflation determines the perceived
price markup, fairness factor, and elasticity of the fairness function:
LEMMA 7. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the steady-state perceived
price markup is a strictly increasing function of steady-state inflation:
Mp(pi) =
ε
ε−1 · exp
(
γ
1− γ pi
)
.
Hence, the steady-state fairness factor is a weakly decreasing function of steady-state
inflation:
F(pi) = 1−θ · (1−χ) ·
[
Mp(pi)− ε
ε−1
]
.
Accordingly, the steady-state elasticity of the fairness function is a strictly increasing
function of steady-state inflation:
φ(pi) =
θ ·Mp(pi)
F(pi)
.
The proof involves manipulating the inference mechanism (8) to obtain Mp, and
using (15) and (16) to obtain F and φ . It appears in Online Appendix B.3.
The lemma shows that in steady state households perceive higher price markups
when inflation is higher. Households understand that in steady state nominal marginal
costs grow at the inflation rate, but because of subproportional inference, they
misjudge the level of those costs and thus of price markups. Since perceived price
markups are higher when inflation is higher, the fairness factor is lower—except when
consumers are fully acclimated (χ = 1), in which case the fairness factor is always
one. Last, the elasticity of the fairness function is higher when inflation is higher.
From Lemma 7, we infer that the long-run Phillips curve is upward sloping:
PROPOSITION 3. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, the steady-state price
markup is a strictly decreasing function of steady-state inflation:
M(pi) = 1+
1
ε−1 ·
1
1+ (1−δ )γ1−δγ φ(pi)
. (17)
Hence, steady-state employment is a strictly increasing function of steady-state
inflation:
N =
[
(ν−1)α
ν
· 1
M(pi)
]1/(1+η)
.
14. This specification does not change anything at the zero-inflation steady state. With zero inflation,
Mp = ε/(ε − 1), so M f = ε/(ε − 1) for any χ . Therefore, the fairness function (15) simplifies to the
function (7) for any χ .
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Thus, the long-run Phillips curve is not vertical (fixed N) but upward sloping.
The proof appears in Online Appendix B.3; its main step is reworking (11) in
steady state to obtain M.
Because the long-run Phillips curve slopes upward for any degree of acclimation,
monetary policy is nonneutral in the long run. In fact, (17) has the same structure as
(6), so the New Keynesian model operates like the monopoly model. After an increase
in inflation, households underappreciate the increase in nominal marginal costs, so
they partly attribute the higher prices to higher markups, which they find unfair. Since
perceived markups are higher, the price elasticity of demand increases, leading firms
to reduce their actual markups.
Last, we obtain comparative statics on the slope of the long-run Phillips curve:
COROLLARY 2. In the New Keynesian model with fairness, around the zero-inflation
steady state, the slope of the long-run Phillips curve is
dpi
d ln(N)
=
1+η
1−δ ·
(1− γ)(1−δγ)
γ2
· ε−1
θ
·
[
1+ (1−δ )γ1−δγ θ
][(
1+ (1−δ )γ1−δγ θ
)
ε−1
]
[1+(1−χ)θ ]ε−1 .
The slope increases with the competitiveness of the goods market (ε) and degree
of acclimation (χ); it decreases with the concern for fairness (θ ) and degree of
underinference (γ).
The proof is relegated to Online Appendix B.3; it builds on the results in Lemma 7
and Proposition 3.
The impact of competitiveness, fairness concern, and degree of underinference
on the slope of the long-run Phillips curve is reminiscent of the impact of these
parameters on the cost passthrough in the monopoly model (see Corollary 1). The
impact of the degree of acclimation is easily understandable. With more acclimation,
perceived fairness (F) depends less on inflation, because consumers adapt more to
different inflation rates. As a result, the elasticity of the fairness function (φ ) depends
less on inflation, and so the Phillips curve (17) is steeper.
The interpretation of the corollary is that lower competitiveness on the goods
market, lower acclimation, stronger concern for fairness, and stronger underinference
flatten the long-run Phillips curve—thus strengthening the long-run effects of
monetary policy.
Simulation Results. To quantify long-run monetary nonneutrality, we compute the
long-run Phillips curve in our calibrated model. Figure 3 displays two versions of the
curve: one describes the relationship between steady-state inflation rate and steady-
state price markup, and the other the relationship between steady-state inflation rate
and steady-state employment. Absent microevidence on acclimation, we compute the
Phillips curve for various degrees of acclimation.
With full acclimation (χ = 1), the Phillips curve is almost vertical, so in the long
run inflation barely affects price markup and employment. For instance, increasing
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FIGURE 3. Long-run Phillips curves for various degrees of acclimation. The top panel gives the
relationship between steady-state inflation rate and steady-state price markup. The bottom panel
gives the relationship between steady-state inflation rate and steady-state employment. In both
panels, inflation is measured as an annual rate. In the bottom panel, employment is measured as
a percentage deviation from employment in the zero-inflation steady state. These long-run Phillips
curve are constructed using the expressions in Proposition 3 under the calibration in Table 3,
for various degrees of acclimation: χ = 0 (no acclimation), χ = 0.3, χ = 0.7, and χ = 1 (full
acclimation).
the inflation rate from 0% to 1% only raises employment by 0.06%. With partial
acclimation, the Phillips curve becomes flatter. With an acclimation of χ = 0.7, the
same increase in inflation raises employment by 0.4%; and with a lower acclimation
of χ = 0.3, it raises employment by 0.8%. Finally, with no acclimation (χ = 0), the
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Phillips curve is even flatter, and inflation has a larger effect on price markup and
employment. Then, increasing inflation from 0% to 1% raises employment by 1.2%.
Comparison with Macroevidence. The property that higher steady-state inflation
leads to higher steady-state employment is consistent with evidence that higher
average inflation leads to lower average unemployment. King and Watson (1994,
Table 1) find in US data that a permanent increase in inflation by 1 percentage point
reduces the unemployment rate between 0.2 and 1.3 percentage points, depending on
the period and identification strategy. King and Watson (1997) confirm these findings,
while highlighting the uncertainty surrounding the Phillips curve’s slope.
Quantitatively, the findings by King and Watson (1994) also agree with our
model’s predictions. Abstracting from possible changes in labor force participation,
their findings imply that increasing inflation by 1 percentage point raises employment
by 0.2% to 1.3%. This magnitude matches the simulation results for a degree of
acclimation between χ = 0 and χ = 0.7.
The mechanism behind the upward-sloping long-run Phillips curve is that higher
steady-state inflation lowers steady-state price markups. There is evidence that this
mechanism operates. Benabou (1992) uncovers that in the US retail sector, higher
average inflation leads to lower average markup. Banerjee and Russell (2005) reach
the same conclusion using aggregate US data.
Comparison with the Literature. In the textbook New Keynesian model, steady-state
inflation also affects the price markup and employment. With Rotemberg pricing,
higher steady-state inflation leads to a lower price markup and higher output, as in our
model (Ascari and Rossi 2012, Figure 1). With Calvo pricing, the opposite occurs:
higher steady-state inflation leads to a higher price markup and lower output, which
appears counterfactual (Ascari and Rossi 2012, Figure 2).15
Our mechanism for an upward-sloping long-run Phillips curve complements the
mechanism proposed by Akerlof et al. (1996) and Benigno and Ricci (2011): that
higher inflation reduces the likelihood that firms facing negative shocks be forced by
downward nominal wage rigidity to fire workers. The two mechanisms may have the
same psychological origin as downward nominal wage rigidity seems to stem from
workers’ fairness concerns (Bewley 2007).
6. Conclusion
This paper develops a theory of pricing to fairness-minded customers that revolves
around two assumptions. First, customers derive more utility from a good priced
at a low markup—perceived as fairly priced—than one priced at a high markup—
perceived as unfairly priced. Second, customers infer firms’ hidden marginal costs
15. Although the New Keynesian models with Rotemberg pricing and Calvo pricing coincide around the
zero-inflation steady state, they differ elsewhere.
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from firms’ prices in a subproportional manner: they infer too little, and to the extent
that they do infer, they misperceive marginal costs as proportional to prices. These
assumptions conform to copious evidence collected from customers and firms.
The main implication of the theory is price rigidity: the passthrough of marginal
costs into prices is strictly less than one. When the theory is embedded into a New
Keynesian model, price rigidity leads to the nonneutrality of monetary policy, both
in the short run and in the long run. Furthermore, we are able to calibrate our
two psychological parameters—concern for fairness and degree of underinference—
from microevidence, just as any other parameter of the model. When simulating the
calibrated model, we obtain realistic impulse responses of output and employment to
monetary shocks: the responses are hump-shaped and have the appropriate amplitude.
We also obtain realistic impulse responses to technology shocks: a transitory
improvement in technology leads to higher output but lower employment.
The paper delineates a mechanism through which fairness affects a market
economy. Hidden information and underinference play crucial roles. When costs are
observable, or when costs are hidden but customers infer them rationally from prices,
our model with fairness is isomorphic to a model without fairness. Only when costs
are hidden and customers infer subproportionally does fairness affect the qualitative
properties of equilibrium, such as by creating price rigidity. Another key ingredient
to our theory is that fairness modifies the price elasticity of demand, which allows
fairness to sway large markets—a feature not shared by common approaches to
fairness (Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Sobel 2007).
Our model helps bridge a gap between the public’s attitude toward inflation and
the harm from inflation described by macroeconomic models. Romer (2002, p. 519)
argues that “There is a wide gap between the popular view of inflation and the costs
of inflation that economist can identify. Inflation is intensely disliked. In periods
when inflation is moderately high in the United States, for example, it is often cited
in opinion polls as the most important problem facing the country. It appears to
have an important effect on the outcome of Presidential elections. Yet, economists
have difficulty in identifying substantial costs of inflation.” Our model contributes to
explaining such intense dislike for inflation.
Finally, we hope that our theory might be fruitfully applied to the study of optimal
monetary policy. Since its microfoundations match the motivations of real-world
customers and firms, as well as their real-world reactions to inflation and deflation,
the theory should underpin a more accurate welfare function that could enhance the
design of monetary policy.
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